Mountaintop Coal Mining and the Clean Water Act: The Fight Over Nationwide Permit 21 by Fuschino, Julia
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 1 Article 6
1-1-2007
Mountaintop Coal Mining and the Clean Water
Act: The Fight Over Nationwide Permit 21
Julia Fuschino
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and the Water
Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Julia Fuschino, Mountaintop Coal Mining and the Clean Water Act: The Fight Over Nationwide Permit
21, 34 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 179 (2007), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol34/iss1/6
MOUNTAINTOP COAL MINING AND THE 
CLEAN WATER ACT: THE FIGHT OVER 
NATIONWIDE PERMIT 21 
Julia Fuschino*
Abstract: The Clean Water Act’s (CWA) goal of protecting the waters of 
the United States has been threatened by the Army Corps of Engineers 
(Corps) increased use of general permits, such as Nationwide Permit 21 
(NWP 21). NWP 21 is issued by the Corps to authorize the disposal of 
material from mountaintop coal mining, even though this type of dis-
posal has serious environmental effects. Recent court rulings have up-
held the use of NWP 21. However, by focusing on the questions left un-
resolved by Congress and the courts, there is an opportunity to help 
guarantee that the goal of the CWA is achieved. To ensure greater envi-
ronmental protection, the adequacy of the minimum impact determina-
tions performed by the Corps when it enacts a NWP should be chal-
lenged to ensure their adequacy, and minimum impact determinations 
should be required before any issuance of a NWP. 
Introduction 
 Several fatal accidents in early 2006 brought national attention to 
the dangers of coal mining1, an industry that has played a central role 
in the Appalachian economy since the mid-1800s.2 Recently, however, 
the increased use of mountaintop coal mining—a method of surface 
mining involving the removal of the upper section of a mountain to 
access underground coal seams—has brought attention to coal min-
ing’s harmful environmental impacts, as well.3
 The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) currently issues a general 
permit—Nationwide Permit 21 (NWP 21)—to authorize the disposal 
of material from mountaintop coal mining.4 Under section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act (CWA), the Corps may only grant general permits 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2006–07. 
1 See Ian Urbina, Senators Have Strong Words for Mine Safety Officials, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 
2006, at A17 [hereinafter Senators Have Strong Words]. 
2 See Paul A. Duffy, How Filled Was My Valley: Continuing the Debate on Disposal Impacts, 17 
Nat. Resources & Env’t 143, 143 (2003). 
3 See Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001). 
4 See Issuance of Nationwide Permits, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2038 ( Jan. 15, 2002). 
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authorizing mountaintop coal mining when no more than “minimal 
adverse environmental effects” result from the activity.5 Environmen-
talists, however, claim that the Corps’s issuance of NWP 21 violates the 
CWA because mountaintop coal mining has serious damaging envi-
ronmental effects.6 This Note addresses the conflict that has arisen as 
a result of the Corps’s use of NWP 21 and discusses court rulings on 
the subject, indicating concerns still unresolved. 
 Part I of this Note describes the current issues surrounding Appa-
lachian coal mining, and provides a brief description of what moun-
taintop coal mining entails. Part II reviews the history of both the 
CWA and the authority of the Corps. Part III examines section 404 of 
the CWA, providing information on its creation and its use by the 
Corps to grant permits. Part IV discusses the types of permits— gen-
eral and specific—that can be issued by the Corps under section 404, 
court rulings affirming such use, and the specific details of NWP 21. 
Part V reviews the debate over the Corps’s issuance of NWP 21, exam-
ining three primary court cases on the topic. Finally, Part VI considers 
the future of NWP 21 given the Corps’s increasing authority over 
permitting and recent court rulings. Part VI also points out issues that 
have not yet been addressed by the courts, and suggests how envi-
ronmentalists can use these to fight for stronger environmental pro-
tection in the future. 
I. Appalachian Coal Mining 
A. Coal Mining and Safety 
 Since the mid-1880s, coal mining has been a major part of the 
Appalachian economy, and accounted for more than half of the 
United States’ total production of coal in 2000.7 In 2005, West Vir-
ginia alone produced over 153 million tons of coal,8 providing almost 
sixty percent of the state’s business tax revenue.9 Coal mining, how-
                                                                                                                      
5 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (2000). 
6 See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286; Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen (Ohio Valley I ), 410 F. 
Supp. 2d 450, 456 (S.D. W. Va. 2004). 
7 Duffy, supra note 2, at 143. 
8 Ian Urbina, West Virginia Governor Urges Mining Moratorium, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 2006, 
at A15 [hereinafter Mining Moratorium] (“West Virginia is the nation’s second-largest coal 
producing state, after Wyoming . . . .”). 
9 Ian Urbina, In Mine Country, Tears, Anguish and a Brief Pause for Safety, N.Y. Times, Feb. 
3, 2006, at A16. 
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ever, is not without risks.10 Although safety has improved over time, 
recent coal mining accidents in West Virginia make clear that mining 
is still dangerous.11
 In early 2006, devastating coal mining accidents in West Virginia 
killed fourteen miners and prompted federal officials to take a serious 
look at federal mining safety regulations and their enforcement.12 
Questions have arisen as to whether the current system of fines is suffi-
cient to induce mine operators to follow safety regulations,13 while min-
ers are saying “some mining operations see paying fines as less expen-
sive than adhering to rules.”14 Also, the Federal Mine Safety and Health 
Administration stated that it could close sections of mines for viola-
tions, but it has little ability to close a mine for “accumulated bad acts.”15
 While federal officials decided what should be done, West Virginia 
Governor Joe Manchin III acted, “urg[ing] all coal companies in the 
state to cease operations until safety could be reviewed.”16 The West 
Virginia Senate and House of Delegates also responded by unani-
mously passing a bill requiring greater safety measures in mines.17 This 
bill, approved by the Governor on January 26, 2006, requires mine op-
erators to store extra breathing packs in their mines as well as give min-
ers devices that would help them locate the packs in emergencies.18
B. Mountaintop Coal Mining and the Environment 
 Along with attacks over the lack of safety enforcement, the coal 
mining industry has currently been facing severe criticism over the en-
vironmental damage caused by mountaintop coal mining.19 Although 
not a new practice, mountaintop coal mining—a method of surface 
                                                                                                                      
10 See id. 
11 See Senators Have Strong Words, supra note 1. 
12 See id. An explosion at the Sago Mine in West Virginia killed twelve miners on Janu-
ary 2, 2006, and on January 19, 2006, two miners were killed at the Aracoma Alma Mine 
No. 1 near Melville from a conveyer belt fire. Id. 
13 Id. (“According to Mine Safety and Health Administration records, the Sago Mine 
received 208 citations in 2005, up from 68 in 2004.”). 
14 Gardiner Harris, Endemic Problem of Safety in Coal Mining, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2006, at 
A13. 
15 Senators Have Strong Words, supra note 1. 
16 Mining Moratorium, supra note 8. 
17 Senators Have Strong Words, supra note 1. 
18 H.B. 4076, 2006 Leg., 77th Sess. (W. Va. 2006), available at www.legis.state.wv.us/ 
Bill_Text_HTML/2006_SESSIONS/RS/BILLS/hb4076%20intr.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 
2006); Senators Have Strong Words, supra note 1. 
19 See Duffy, supra note 2, at 143. 
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mining—only became widespread in Appalachia in the 1990s.20 Since 
then, significant debates have arisen over the legality of general permits 
issued by the Corps.21 Specifically, many environmentalists contend that 
the Corps cannot use NWP 21 to authorize the disposal of material 
from this type of mining.22
 Mountaintop coal mining involves the removal of the entire up-
per section of a mountain to access underground coal seams.23  The 
rock above the seam is removed and placed in adjacent valleys.24 After 
the coal is extracted, the removed rock—known as overburden—is 
replaced in an effort to achieve the original contour of the moun-
tain.25 However, because broken-up rock occupies a larger volume than 
it does in its natural state, excess overburden remains in the valleys.26
 Considerable disruption to the immediate environment occurs as 
a result of these practices, causing a clash between environmentalists 
and mining corporations.27 Environmentalists claim that mountain-
top coal mining has serious environmental effects.28 Excess overbur-
den that remains in valleys creates valley fills that often bury intermit-
tent and perennial streams and drainage areas near the 
mountaintop.29 This can increase the risk of flooding, contribute to 
landslides, and pollute streams and rivers in the region.30 However, 
the most notable effect of mountaintop coal mining is the change in 
topography— converting areas of high, forested mountains sur-
rounded by deep valleys and gorges into treeless plateaus.31 This not 
only changes the aesthetic appeal of the area, but destroys high-
quality forest habitats, threatening migratory birds and other wildlife 
populations in the area.32
                                                                                                                      
20 Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001); Duffy, supra note 2, at 
144. 
21 See Duffy, supra note 2, at 143. 
22 See, e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen (Ohio Valley II ), 429 F.3d 493, 505 (4th Cir. 
2005); Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh (Rivenburgh III ), 317 F.3d 
425 (4th Cir. 2003); Bragg, 248 F.3d 275. 
23 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286; Duffy, supra note 2, at 144. 
30 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286; Duffy, supra note 2, at 144. 
31 Duffy, supra note 2, at 144. 
32 Id. 
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 In section 404 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), Congress tried to 
appease both environmentalists and mining corporations.33 Accord-
ingly, the Corps may only grant general permits authorizing disposal of 
dredge and fill material from mountaintop coal mining when no more 
than “minimal adverse environmental effects” result from the activity.34 
While conceding that mining does have some environmental impacts, 
mining companies emphasize that the land is reclaimed when the min-
ing operations are completed.35 Mountaintop removal is thought to be 
the most profitable and efficient mountaintop mining technique, ena-
bling companies to maximize coal production at comparatively low 
costs and thereby supply jobs and increased tax revenues to Appala-
chian communities.36 Companies also stress that coal mining is not only 
critical to the local economies, but is also necessary for generating elec-
tricity for the entire country.37 Therefore, there has been considerable 
debate over whether the Corps’s issuance of general permits for moun-
taintop mining violates section 404 of the CWA.38
II. The History of the CWA and the Rivers  
and Harbors Appropriations Act 
A. Overview of the CWA 
 The CWA, derived from the old Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act (FWPCA), was given its modern form in its 1972 amendments.39 
Through these amendments, Congress intended to create a national 
program to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity of the Nation’s waters.”40 This goal was to be achieved by 
                                                                                                                      
33 See Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal 
Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 
527, 536–37 (2005). 
34 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (2000). 
35 Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286; Mountaintop Mining, http://www.mountaintopmining. 
com/#back (last visited Dec. 28, 2006). 
36 Duffy, supra note 2, at 144. 
37 Lisa Lambert, Mountaintop Mining Would Be Safer, Some Say, Reuters News Service 
( Jan. 25, 2006), available at http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/34661/ 
story.htm. 
38 Duffy, supra note 2, at 143. 
39 Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and 
Society 620 (3d. ed. 2004). Although the Federal Water Pollution Control Act had come 
to be known as the CWA, the label “Clean Water Act” was not officially acknowledged by 
Congress until the 1977 amendments. Murchison, supra note 33, at 557. 
40 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
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prohibiting the discharge of any pollutant into the waters of the United 
States without a permit.41
 Although the CWA has placed restrictions on what can be re-
leased into the waters of the United States, it does not cover all dis-
charges.42 It divides sources of pollution into two types—point sources 
and nonpoint sources43—and defines “discharge of a pollutant” as the 
“addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”44 
The CWA sets effluent limitations only upon the discharge of pollut-
ants from point sources.45 Nonpoint sources are not covered; there-
fore, no strict effluent limitations are imposed on these sources by the 
CWA.46
 It has been ruled that certain conditions created by, or equipment 
used in, mining operations and land clearing constitute point sources 
subject to regulation under the CWA.47 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit held that surface runoff from rainfall, when collected 
or channeled by mine operators, constitutes a point source of pollu-
tion.48 Hence, spoil piles—waste removed from a coal extraction—are 
classified as point sources of pollution if pollutants are transported 
from the piles by rainfall runoff through erosion-created ditches and 
gulleys and eventually deposited in navigable waters.49 Also, certain 
pieces of clearing equipment that cause discharge of soil elsewhere— 
such as bulldozers fitted with V-blades and raking blades and ditch ex-
cavation equipment—were found to be point sources of pollution.50
                                                                                                                      
41 See id. § 1342(a)(1). 
42 See  id. § 1311(b)(1)(A). 
43 See id. §§ 1311(b)(1)(A), 1362(12). 
The term “point source” means any discernible, confined and discrete con-
veyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, con-
duit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feed-
ing operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or 
may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural stormwater dis-
charges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 
Id. § 1362(14). 
44 Id. § 1362(12). 
45 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A). 
46 See id. § 1311. 
47 Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., 620 F.2d 41, 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1980). 
48 Id. at 47. 
49 Id. at 45. 
50 Avoyelles Sportmen’s League v. Alexander, 473 F. Supp. 525, 532 (W.D. La. 1979). 
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 Except for those exempted under section 404(f)(1),51 point 
sources of pollution are regulated by permit programs under sections 
402 and 404 of the CWA.52 Section 402 of the CWA established the Na-
tional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), giving the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to issue permits limiting 
discharges of specific concentrations of pollutants.53 However, as a result 
of Congress’s concern that the NPDES would prohibit work needed to 
maintain navigation, section 404 of the CWA was also enacted.54
 Section 404 authorizes the Corps to regulate discharges of 
dredge and fill material into the navigable waters55 of the United 
States.56 Dredge material is defined by the Corps as “material that is 
excavated or dredged from waters of the United States.”57 Fill is de-
fined as “material placed in waters of the United States where the ma-
terial has the effect of: (i) [r]eplacing any portion of a water of the 
United States with dry land; or (ii) [c]hanging the bottom elevation 
of any portion of a water of the United States.”58 Rocks, soil, sand, 
clay, and overburden from mining or other excavation activities are 
examples of fill material regulated by the Corps under section 404.59
B. A Brief History of the Corps’s Authority 
 Created by Congress in 1802, the Corps  began as a military and 
civil works agency.60 Over the course of the nineteenth century, the 
Corps’s activities expanded to include altering rivers and harbors to 
                                                                                                                      
51 This section exempts from the permitting process the discharge of dredge and fill 
material from certain activities, such as normal farming and some forms of maintenance 
and construction. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1). 
52 See id. §§ 1342, 1344. 
53 Id. § 1342. 
54 Thomas Addison & Timothy Burns, The Army Corps of Engineers and Nationwide Permit 
26: Wetlands Protection for Swamp Reclamation?, 18 Ecology L.Q. 619, 627 (1991). 
55 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (“The term ‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas.”); 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (2005) (“Navigable waters of the 
United States are those waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and/or are 
presently used, or have been used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport 
interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
56 33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
57 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c). Discharge of dredged materials includes any runoff or overflow 
from a contained land or water disposal area, as well as any addition of dredged material 
into the waters of the United States that is incidental to any activity, other than incidental 
fallback—the redeposit of small amounts of dredged material into essentially the same 
place as the initial removal. Id. § 323.2(d). 
58 Id. § 323.2(e)(1). 
59 Id. § 323.2(e)(2). Trash and garbage are not considered fill. Id. § 323.2(e)(3). 
60 Addison & Burns, supra note 54, at 623–24. 
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promote navigation.61 In response to the 1888 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch—holding that where there 
was no federal regulatory scheme, states could authorize or prohibit 
dams, bridges, and other obstructions to navigation62—Congress en-
acted the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (RHA).63 RHA required ap-
proval from the Corps for all construction activities and other ob-
structions to navigation, as well as for depositing refuse into navigable 
waters.64
 Although the Corps initially limited its monitoring and enforce-
ment activities under the RHA, in the late 1950s and 1960s it felt pres-
sure to broaden its regulation to cover water quality and natural re-
source conservation.65 The Corps thus adopted a “public interest” 
criterion for granting permits under the RHA.66 The Corps, however, 
was not expressly required to protect the environment until the en-
actment of the CWA.67 With the creation of section 404, the Corps’s 
authority was extended beyond the coverage of the RHA to include 
permitting for dredge and fill materials in waters of the United 
States.68
III. The Exception: Section 404 
 Unique in the CWA, section 404 operates as an exception to both 
the CWA’s general prohibition against pollution in waterways and the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.69 In the absence of 
section 404, dredged spoil disposal could violate the CWA by smother-
ing benthic life,70 displacing water with land, and potentially discharg-
ing prohibited chemicals into the water.71 In addition, section 404 
goes against the CWA’s general scheme by placing discharge permit-
ting authority in the Corps rather than EPA, which was otherwise 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. 
62 125 U.S. 1, 17 (1888). 
63 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 401–418 (2000)). 
64 See 33 U.S.C. § 407. 
65 See Addison & Burns, supra note 54, at 625. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 626. 
68 Murchison, supra note 33, at 548. 
69 Addison & Burns, supra note 54, at 627. 
70 Benthic life consists of organisms that live at or near the bottom of the sea. The Ox-
ford English Dictionary 117 (2d ed. 1989). 
71 Addison & Burns, supra note 54, at 627. 
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given administrative responsibility for the CWA.72 The Corps, how-
ever, does not exercise its authority under section 404 independ-
ently.73 Sharing responsibility for the control of dredge or fill materi-
als, EPA has authority to promulgate guidelines governing the Corps’s 
issuance of permits.74 Also, EPA can veto a permit granted by the 
Corps when it finds that the activity would have “an unacceptable ad-
verse effect” on water quality.75
A. The History of Section 404:  National Resource Defense  
Council, Inc. v. Callaway 
 The scope of section 404 extends to navigable waters, making the 
definition of “navigable waters” highly important.76 The Corps and 
EPA initially had vastly different meanings for the term.77 Consistent 
with the RHA, the Corps interpreted “navigable waters” to mean wa-
ters that are “subject to the ebb and flow of the tide or were, are, or 
could be made navigable in fact.”78 However, EPA relied on the legis-
lative history of the CWA and adopted a broader definition that in-
cluded non-navigable tributaries in addition to waters covered by the 
Corps’s definition.79
 The conflict between the two definitions was resolved in Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, a lawsuit brought by citizen 
environmental groups.80 The D.C. District Court held in favor of 
EPA’s definition, reasoning that Congress did not intend the term 
“navigable waters” to be restricted solely to traditional tests of naviga-
bility.81 Instead, the court found that “navigable waters,” having been 
defined as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial 
seas,” was meant to assert jurisdiction to the maximum extent permis-
sible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.82 The court 
concluded that the Secretary of the Army and Chief of the Corps 
acted “unlawfully and in derogation of their responsibilities” under 
                                                                                                                      
72 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). 
73 See id. § 1344(c). 
74 See id. § 1344(b). 
75 See id. § 1344(c). 
76 See id. § 1344. 
77 Addison & Burns, supra note 54, at 628. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). 
81 Id. at 686. 
82 Id. 
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the CWA by adopting a different definition.83 Thus, by requiring the 
Corps to adopt the broader meaning of “navigable waters,” this deci-
sion vastly extended the Corps’s regulatory domain.84
B. Beginning of Permitting for the Corps 
 After the decision in Callaway, the Corps proposed regulations 
for implementing section 404.85 After receiving numerous comments 
on the proposed regulations,86 the Corps promulgated a set of in-
terim final section 404 regulations and requested further comment.87 
As part of these regulations, a procedure for processing general per-
mits was created.88 The Corps hoped that this mechanism would fa-
cilitate the establishment of a more administratively manageable regu-
latory program.89 Accordingly, instead of issuing individual permits, 
the District Engineer was to issue a single permit for certain “clearly 
described categories of structures or work.”90 Conditions specifying 
the maximum quantity of material authorized to be discharged, the 
category or categories of activities, and the type of waters in which the 
activity could occur were to be set by the District Engineer when issu-
ing a general permit.91
 Although the Corps may not have anticipated that its expanded 
jurisdiction would last, it continued.92 In 1977, Congress amended the 
CWA, affirming prior developments in the section 404 program.93 Ac-
cordingly, section 404 still applied to the discharge of dredge or fill 
material into navigable waters, with these waters now being defined as 
“waters of the United States.”94 Thus, Congress confirmed the broad 
                                                                                                                      
83 Id. 
84 Addison & Burns, supra note 54, at 629. 
85 See id. 
86 Charles D. Ablard & Brian Boru O’Neill, Wetland Protection and Section 404 of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: A Corps of Engineers Renaissance, 1 Vt. L. 
Rev. 51, 80 n.114 (1976) (noting that the interim regulations received over 1500 com-
ments). 
87 Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 
( July 25, 1975). 
88 Id. at 31,335. 
89 Id. at 31,322. 
90 Id. at 31,335. 
91 Id. 
92 Addison & Burns, supra note 54, at 631. 
93 Id. at 632. 
94 See 22 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000). 
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scope given section 404 by the Callaway court.95 In doing so, it re-
jected the idea of limiting the jurisdictional scope of section 404, 
which had been brought up by the previous Congress.96
 When the Corps issued revisions to its regulations in July 1977, it 
reorganized its entire regulatory program.97 Altering its jurisdictional 
limits, the Corps extended the scope of its regulation.98 To cope with 
the new expansive definitions, the Corps increased its use of general 
permits, issuing a number of them under both section 10 of the 
RHA99 and section 404 of the CWA.100
IV. Issuance of Permits for Dredge and Fill Under the CWA 
A. Types of Permits 
 The Corps has authority to issue two types of permits—individual 
and general—for the discharge of dredged or fill materials.101 Section 
404(a) of the CWA authorizes the Corps to issue individual permits 
for the discharge of this material into the navigable waters at specified 
disposal sites only after notice and opportunity for public hearings.102 
The Corps authorizes an individual permit following an intensive 
case-by-case evaluation of a specific project.103
 To reduce paper work and delay, and thereby alleviate some of 
the Corps’s burden, Congress added section 404(e) to the CWA.104 
This enabled the Corps to “define categories of discharge activities 
that do not require permittees and the Corps to undergo the exten-
                                                                                                                      
95 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 
(D.D.C. 1975). 
96 Addison & Burns, supra note 54, at 632. 
97 Regulatory Program of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 ( July 19, 1977). 
98 Addison & Burns, supra note 54, at 631. The Corps expanded its jurisdiction from 
areas below the headwaters to the entire length of streams and removed the size limit on 
the definition of lakes. Id. 
99 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000) (authorizing the Corps to regulate dredging, filling, and 
construction activities in navigable waters). 
100 Regulatory Program of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. at 37,126–32. 
101 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (e) (2000). 
102 Id. § 1344(a)–(c). 
103 Crutchfield v. County of Hanover, 325 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir. 2003) (recognizing 
that individual permits “require[] a resource-intensive review that entails submission of 
voluminous application materials, extensive site-specific research and documentation, 
promulgation of public notice, opportunity for public comment, consultation with other 
federal agencies, and a formal analysis justifying the ultimate decision to issue or refuse 
the permit.”); 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(g) (2005). 
104 Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen (Ohio Valley I ), 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 454 (S.D. W. 
Va. 2004). 
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sive individual permit review process of Section 404(a).”105 Unlike the 
individual permits under section 404(a), general permits under sec-
tion 404(e) allow certain activities to go forward with minimal in-
volvement by the Corps.106
 A general permit is issued on a national or regional basis for a 
category of activities when the activities are “substantially similar in na-
ture and cause only minimal individual and cumulative environmental 
impacts.”107 General permits can also be issued when doing so “would 
result in avoiding unnecessary duplication of regulatory control exer-
cised by another Federal, State, or local agency provided it has been 
determined that the environmental consequences of the action are in-
dividually and cumulatively minimal.”108
 Nationwide permits (NWPs) are general permits which are na-
tional in scope.109 According to the Corps, these permits are used to 
authorize minor activities that are generally uncontroversial.110 When 
issuing, reissuing, or modifying a NWP, the Corps complies with the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by issuing an Environmental 
Assessment (EA), which “consider[s] the environmental effects of each 
NWP from a national perspective.”111 Although the Corps is preparing 
a voluntary programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS) for 
the NWP program, it contends that the program does not reach the 
level of significant impacts that requires the preparation of an EIS.112 
The Corps based this determination on the fact that NWPs are author-
ized only for activities that have no more than minimal adverse effects 
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. 
106 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The relevant portion states: 
In carrying out his functions relating to the discharge of dredged or fill mate-
rial under this section, the [Corps] may, after notice and opportunity for pub-
lic hearing, issue general permits on a State, regional, or nationwide basis for 
any category of activities involving discharges of dredged or fill material if the 
[Corps] determines that the activities in such category are similar in nature, 
will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed sepa-
rately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environ-
ment. Any general permit issued under this subsection shall . . . set forth the 
requirements and standards which shall apply to any activity authorized by 
such general permit. 
Id. § 1344(e). 
107 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(h). 
108 Id. 
109 Ohio Valley I, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 455. 
110 Issuance of Nationwide Permits, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2022 ( Jan. 15, 2002). 
111 Id. at 2025. 
112 Id. 
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on the aquatic environment.113 The Corps also reasoned that the reis-
suance process of NWPs every five years helps ensure there are no 
more than minimal impacts.114
B. The Courts’ Views on Section 404 
 Although Congress appears satisfied with the extent of the 
Corps’s authority over dredge and fill activities, the courts have still 
had to address the issue on numerous occasions.115 In Buttrey v. United 
States, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
confirmed the constitutionality of the Corps’s role under section 
404.116 Rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that section 404 is unconstitu-
tional because it delegates jurisdiction to a part of the military, the 
court noted that the constitutional authority for section 404 rests in 
the Commerce Clause, and that administration by the Corps does not 
infringe upon any of the provisions of the Constitution.117 However, 
the court made it clear that “the Corps is limited in its authority to 
that which Congress provides and remains subject to revocation of 
that authority at any time at the will of Congress.”118
 In the absence of further congressional action, the courts— hav-
ing been left to address section 404 questions—usually rely on the 
congressional intent.119 Thus, in United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 
Corps’s broad authority,120 holding that the Corps acted reasonably in 
interpreting the CWA to require permits for the discharge of fill ma-
terial into all wetlands adjacent to navigable or interstate waters and 
their tributaries.121 The Court has, however, recognized that some con-
stitutional limits exist as to how far Congress can extend the CWA’s 
coverage beyond navigable-in-fact waters.122 In Solid Waste Agency v. 
                                                                                                                      
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 171, 174 (2001); 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 129–30 (1985); United States 
v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 453–54 (6th Cir. 2003). 
116 690 F.2d 1186, 1189–90 (1982). 
117 Id. at 1189. 
118 Id. at 1190. 
119 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172–73; Riverside, 474 U.S. at 130. 
120 See 474 U.S. at 134 (concluding that frequent flooding is not required to be consid-
ered waters of the United States). 
121Id. at 133 (“[T]he evident breadth of congressional concern for protection of water 
quality and aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps to interpret the 
term ‘waters’ to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more conventionally defined.”). 
122 See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173. 
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U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Court held that permanent and sea-
sonal ponds with no hydrological connection to other waterways are 
beyond section 404’s regulatory authority.123 The Court stated that for 
there to be jurisdiction under the CWA, there must be a “significant 
nexus between the wetlands and ‘navigable waters.’”124
 Although it has been argued that Solid Waste Agency was meant to 
significantly restrict the Corps’s jurisdiction, the lower courts have not 
always agreed.125 In United States v. Deaton and United States v. Rapanos, 
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits held that where wetlands drain into a 
ditch which must pass through other waterways to get to navigable-in-
fact water, there is jurisdiction under the CWA.126 Similarly, in United 
States v. Hubenka, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that non-navigable tribu-
taries which enable potential pollutants to migrate to navigable waters 
downstream can constitute a “significant nexus.”127
 In Rapanos v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the 
definition of “navigable waters” under the CWA.128 It held that the term 
“navigable waters” includes only relatively permanent, standing or flow-
ing bodies of water and does not include intermittent or ephemeral 
flows of water.129 Thus, the Court articulated limits—although broad 
ones—to the Corps’s authority.130
C. Nationwide Permit 21 (NWP 21) 
 Relying on section 404(e) of the CWA, the Corps issued NWP 
21.131 NWP 21 is a general permit for discharges into the waters of the 
United States of dredged or fill material associated with surface coal 
mining and reclamation operations.132 According to NWP 21, project 
                                                                                                                      
 
123 Id. at 163, 173–74. 
124 Id. at 167. 
125 See United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702, 712 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. 
Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2003). 
126 Deaton, 332 F.3d at 702, 712; Rapanos, 339 F.3d at 449, 453. 
127 438 F.3d 1026, 1034 (10th Cir. 2006). 
128 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2225 (2006) 
129 Id. 
130 See id. 
131 See Issuance of Nationwide Permits, 67 Fed. Reg. 2020, 2022 ( Jan. 15, 2002). 
132 Id. at 2020, 2081. NWP 21 states: 
Discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the US associated with 
surface coal mining and reclamation operations provided the coal mining ac-
tivities are authorized by the DOI, Office of Surface Mining (OSM), or by 
states with approved programs under Title V of the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act of 1977 and provided the permittee notifies the District 
Engineer in accordance with the “Notification” General Condition. In addi-
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proponents must file a preconstruction notification (PCN) with the 
appropriate district.133 Also, unlike other NWPs, the Corps must sup-
port all NWP 21 projects by written authorization before the projects 
can proceed to construction.134 Historically, however, the Corps has 
approved almost every application it has received for the disposal of 
fill in the form of mountaintop spoil placed in valleys.135
 By law, a NWP is effective for a period of five years.136 Therefore, 
every five years the Corps reviews and reissues NWPs.137 The most re-
cent review occurred in 2002, when the Corps reissued NWP 21 and 
made several changes.138 First, the Corps required that before it au-
thorizes any project, it must make a case-by-case determination that 
the adverse effects to the aquatic environment caused by the pro-
posed activity are minimal both individually and cumulatively.139 Sec-
ond, the Corps began to require a compensatory mitigation plan to 
ensure that losses to the aquatic environment are minimal.140
V. Authority of the Corps over Mountaintop Mining:  
The NWP 21 Debate 
 The issuance of NWP 21 has caused significant debate over the 
Corps’s authority to grant a general permit for the disposal of material 
from mountaintop coal mining.141 District courts in Appalachia have 
repeatedly ruled in favor of the environmentalists, holding that the 
Corps does not have the authority to enforce this type of regulation.142 
These recent decisions have run “counter to the Bush administration’s 
                                                                                                                      
tion, to be authorized by this NWP, the District Engineer must determine that 
the activity complies with the terms and conditions of the NWP and that the 
adverse environmental effects are minimal both individually and cumulatively 
and must notify the project sponsor of this determination in writing. 
Id. 
133 Id. at 2090. 
134 Id. 
135 Duffy, supra note 2, at 145. 
136 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(2) (2000). 
137 See id.; Issuance of Nationwide Permits, 67 Fed. Reg. at 2020. 
138 Issuance of Nationwide Permits, 67 Fed. Reg. at 2020, 2039. 
139 Id. at 2038. 
140 Id. 
141 See generally Duffy, supra note 2, at 143 (discussing the debate over whether the dis-
posal of waste from mountaintop coal mining is illegal under federal environmental laws). 
142 See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen (Ohio Valley I ), 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 470–71 
(S.D. W. Va. 2004); Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 656–57 (S.D. W. Va. 1999), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
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stated goals of both maximizing domestic fuel production and easing 
federal environmental restrictions on coal mining operations.”143 In 
contrast, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
either avoided the question or ruled in favor of the Corps.144
A. The First Attempt to Challenge the Corps’s Authority: Bragg v. Robertson 
 Finding that the primary purpose for disposing spoil is to dispose 
waste—which is regulated by section 402—the district court in Bragg v. 
Robertson held that the Corps does not have authority under section 
404 to regulate the disposal of spoil in valley fills.145 However, the 
Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s injunction, concluding that 
sovereign immunity bars a citizen-suit challenge against a state official 
in federal court under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act (SMCRA).146 Importantly though, the Fourth Circuit upheld the 
settlements that the parties arrived at with the district court’s ap-
proval.147
 According to the settlements, the Corps and several other federal 
entities agreed to prepare a comprehensive EIS to analyze the adverse 
environmental impacts of mountaintop strip mining.148 The Corps also 
agreed to postpone issuing NWP 21 permits for valley fills in West Vir-
ginia that could affect watersheds greater than 250 acres.149 Although 
the Corps agreed to comply with the terms of this settlement when it 
reissued NWP 21 in 2002, it chose not to extend the 250-acre restriction 
to jurisdictions outside of West Virginia.150
 Another result of this lawsuit was that the Corps decided to revise 
its definition of “discharge of fill material” to be compatible with EPA’s 
definition.151 Thus, the Corps removed the “primary purpose” clause 
from its definition.152 Under its previous definition of “discharge of fill 
materials” —which included a “primary purpose” clause—the Corps 
could not issue a permit if fill was discharged as waste instead of used to 
                                                                                                                      
143 Duffy, supra note 2, at 143. 
144 See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen (Ohio Valley II ), 429 F.3d 493. 496 (4th Cir. 
2005); Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh (Rivenburgh III ), 317 F.3d 
425, 436, 448 (4th Cir. 2003); Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286. 
145 Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 657. 
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convert water to dry land.153 Thus, by changing its definition, the Corps 
hoped to prevent the possibility that a subsequent court ruling would 
find general permits for valley fills to be illegal.154
B. Challenging the Minimal Impacts: Kentuckians for the 
Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh 
 Following in the footsteps of Bragg, Kentuckians for the Com-
monwealth (KFTC) brought suit in response to the Corps’s issuance 
of a NWP 21, which allowed the Martin County Coal Corporation 
(MCCC) to fill streams with spoil from coal strip mining.155 Noting 
that over the past twenty years, these activities have buried over 1500 
miles of streams in Kentucky and West Virginia, KFTC attempted to 
stop further damage to the environment by pointing out that moun-
taintop mining causes more than minimal environmental impacts.156
 As in Bragg, the District Court for the Southern District of West 
Virginia initially heard the case.157 Again siding with the plaintiffs, the 
district court concluded that Congress did not intend the Corps’s sec-
tion 404 authority to extend to fill disposed of as waste.158 Thus, the 
court sustained the plaintiff’s challenge to NWP 21 and enjoined the 
issuance of the permit in question.159 In addition, the court enjoined 
any future permits by the Corps’s Huntington District office that have 
no primary purpose except to allow the disposal of spoil removed 
from mountaintop mining into the valley.160
 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s pre-
liminary injunction against future permits, finding it broader than 
necessary to grant relief to the plaintiffs.161 Also, the court found that 
the Corps did not need a constructive purpose to authorize valley 
fills.162 The Corps’s interpretation of “fill material” under section 404— 
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as defined as “all material that displaces water or changes the bottom 
elevation of a water body except for ‘waste’” —was determined to be 
reasonable.163
C. Using NEPA and CWA to Challenge NWP 21: Ohio Valley 
Environmental Coalition v. Bolen 
 Not willing to give up the fight over NWP 21, West Virginia envi-
ronmental groups joined together to sue the Corps, claiming that the 
issuance of NWP 21 does not comply with the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) or the CWA, and is therefore “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion and otherwise not in accordance with law.”164 
The plaintiffs identified eleven projects approved by the Corps pursu-
ant to NWP 21, together having a total impact on approximately 
140,000 feet of waters in West Virginia.165
 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia 
held for the plaintiffs, finding that the Corps’s approach to authorizing 
valley fills and surface impoundments pursuant to NWP 21 fails the first 
part of the analysis set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,166 because it does not comply with the plain lan-
guage of the CWA.167 The district court concluded that 404(e) of the 
CWA: (1) “directs the Corps to determine that certain activities will in-
variably have only minimal effects on the environment;” (2) requires 
the Corps to issue NWPs only for those activities determined before 
issuance to have minimal environmental impact; and (3) requires that 
general permits authorize discharges to proceed without further in-
volvement from the Corps.168
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overburden). 
164 See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Bulen (Ohio Valley I ), 410 F. Supp. 2d 450, 456 (S.D. 
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 The district court found, however, that NWP 21 violates all of 
these CWA requirements.169 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
reasoned that NWP 21 “defines a procedure instead of permitting a 
category of activities” as well as “provides for a post hoc, case-by-case 
evaluation of environmental impact.”170 It also found that NWP 21 
authorized projects to proceed only after receiving individualized ap-
proval from the Corps, in contradiction to Congress’s intent for no 
individualized approval for general permits under the CWA.171 Finally, 
the district court concluded that NWP 21 violated the statutory re-
quirement that the Corps provide notice and opportunity for public 
hearing before issuing a permit.172
 As a result of these discrepancies between the CWA and the 
Corps’s NWP 21, the district court determined that the permit was 
facially invalid, and enjoined the Corps from issuing authorizations 
pursuant to NWP 21 in the Southern District of West Virginia.173 The 
district court also ordered the Corps to suspend authorizations for 
valley fill and surface impoundments for the specific mining sites 
challenged by the plaintiff on which construction had not commenced 
as of July 8, 2004.174 In August 2004, the court extended its injunction 
to cover all NWP 21 permits issued prior to its July order, under which 
fill or impoundment construction had not begun as of the July or-
der.175
 The Corps appealed to the Fourth Circuit.176 Although many be-
lieved the district court’s ruling would be affirmed,177 the Fourth Cir-
cuit found that the Corps complied with Section 404 of the CWA 
when it issued NWP 21.178 Thus, the Fourth Circuit vacated the dis-
trict court’s decision, reinstating the use of nationwide general per-
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mits to allow coal companies to dispose of mining waste in valleys and 
streams.179
 In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals discussed the 
lower court’s reasons for its decision, rejecting each one in turn.180 
First, the court concluded that NWP 21 does not define a procedure, 
as was claimed by the district court, but instead “plainly authorizes a 
‘category of activities.’”181 The court also noted that nothing in sec-
tion 404(e) restricts the use of procedural, along with substantive, pa-
rameters to define a category.182
 Second, the court of appeals found that the district court erred 
in determining that the Corps did not make the required minimal-
impact determinations before issuance of the nationwide permit.183 
The Corps argued that section 404(e) does not unambiguously re-
quire these determinations be made before issuance of a nationwide 
permit.184 However, the court did not rule on this issue.185 It simply 
concluded that minimal-impact determinations were completed by 
the Corps before issuing NWP 21.186 Again, however, the court did not 
consider whether these determinations were arbitrary or capri-
cious.187 It left the argument up to the plaintiffs to reassert on re-
mand.188
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180 Id. at 498–504. 
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The category of activities authorized by NWP 21 consists of those discharges 
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 The court did, however, find that the issuance of a general permit 
does not “guarantee ab initio that every instance of the permitted activ-
ity will have only a minimum impact.”189 It concluded that the Corps’s 
ex ante determinations of minimal impact could not be anything more 
than reasoned predictions.190 The court also stated that no provision of 
the CWA specifies “how the Corps must make the minimal-impact de-
terminations, the degree of certainty that must undergird them, or the 
extent to which the Corps may rely on post-issuance procedures in 
making them.”191
 Third, the Fourth Circuit concluded that section 404 does not 
“unambiguously prohibit[] the Corps from creating a general permit 
that authorizes activities to proceed only after receiving individualized 
approval from the Corps.”192 Since the term “general permit” is not 
defined in the CWA, the court concluded that there is no explicit tex-
tual basis for this argument.193 Also, the court reasoned that section 
404 does not prohibit the creation of a general permit with a re-
quirement of individualized consideration of approval simply because 
it provides separate provisions for individual and general permits.194
 Finally, overruling the district court’s last basis for invalidating 
NWP 21, the court of appeals concluded that section 404 does not 
require notice and a hearing before the Corps authorizes an individ-
ual project under a general permit.195 All that is statutorily required is 
that notice and opportunity for public hearing be provided before the 
general permit itself is issued.196 Thus, the court found that the Corps 
fulfilled its obligation under the CWA to provide notice and opportu-
nity for public hearing before determining that the category of activi-
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191 Id. at 500. The court found that because the CWA is silent on the issue of whether 
the Corps can make its pre-issuance minimal-impact determinations by relying in part on 
the fact that its post-issuance procedures will ensure that the authorized projects will have 
only minimal impacts, it must defer to the Corps’s conclusion that it may do so. Id. at 501. 
However, the court suggests that section 404(e) does not permit the Corps to completely 
defer to minimum-impact determinations until after issuance of the permit. Id. at 502. 
192 Id. at 503. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. (finding that because the CWA does not speak to this issue, and that the Corps’s 
interpretation is reasonable, the Corps’s construction is entitled to Chevron deference). 
195 Id. at 504 (“[O]ne cannot infer such a requirement from the fact that individual 
permits can issue only after notice and opportunity for public hearing.”). 
196 Ohio Valley II, 429 F.3d at 504. 
200 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:179 
ties authorized by NWP 21 would have only minimal adverse effects 
on the environment.197
VI. The Future of NWP 21 
 Although recent coal-mining accidents have prompted national 
attention concerning the dangers to mine workers,198 the movement 
to protect the environment from coal-mining dangers has encoun-
tered a considerable roadblock.199 Frequent lawsuits have helped por-
tray the significant damage that can result from mountaintop coal 
mining;200 however, the Fourth Circuit’s rulings in Bragg v. W. Va. Coal 
Ass’n, Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh (Rivenburgh 
III ), and Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Bulen (Ohio Valley II ) 
have made the fight to protect the environment difficult by upholding 
the use of NWP 21.201 The environmental movement may have stalled, 
but the numerous questions left unresolved by Congress and the 
courts indicate that the fight is far from over.202 Although the use of 
NWP 21 will likely continue, a better balance can still be reached to 
ensure greater environmental protection. 
A. The Corps’s Permitting and Its Environmental Consequences 
 By finding that NWP 21 does not violate the CWA, the court in 
Ohio Valley II followed the path laid out by numerous earlier court rul-
ings, granting increasing environmental regulatory power to the Corps. 
203 However, because the Corps has tried to deal with its expanding 
workload by increasing the use of general permits—and courts have by 
and large allowed this204—the Corps’s growing power has not always 
been matched with increased environmental protection. 
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 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia 
was correct in concluding that the Corps’s decision to change its defini-
tion of “discharge of fill material” —so that it could regulate the dis-
posal of spoil in valley fills with decreased likelihood of a court finding 
the permit to be illegal—was not in the interest of the environment.205 
However, in Rivenburgh III, the Fourth Circuit allowed for this change in 
definition anyway.206 This ruling permitted the Corps’s increased juris-
diction under its 404 permits, enabling the Corps to issue more general 
permits, specifically NWP 21.207
 Although the Corps stated that NWPs are used to authorize minor 
activities that are generally uncontroversial,208 it issued NWP 21 for the 
very controversial activity of discharging dredge or fill materials from 
mountaintop coal mining, which now includes discharge into valley 
fills.209 Because they provide a higher level of environmental protec-
tion, specific permits are preferable over nationwide permits.210 They 
require notice and opportunity for public hearings before each indi-
vidual project, and are authorized only after a case-by-case evaluation of 
the specific project.211 Nationwide permits, however, allow a project to 
move forward with minimal involvement by the Corps, and provide no-
tice and opportunity for public hearing only before the Corps issues 
the general permit, not before each individual project is authorized 
under the permit.212 Therefore, it is likely that activities that could 
cause environmental harm will be overlooked under NWPs. 
B. Continuing the Fight Against NWP 21 After Ohio Valley II 
 Considered a setback for environmental groups, Ohio Valley II sim-
ply reinstated what the Corps had been doing—issuing NWP 21 for 
mountaintop coal mining.213 While seemingly anti-environment, the 
court in Ohio Valley II left many issues in the NWP 21 debate unresolved, 
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enabling environmentalists to raise them another time.214 Thus, al-
though the Fourth Circuit’s previous rulings indicate that it is likely to 
find NWP 21 to be legal,215 the door is open to future litigation that 
could have beneficial environmental impacts. 
 Environmentalists can challenge NWP 21 by arguing that the 
minimum-impact determinations made by the Corps in enacting NWP 
21 were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.216 In Ohio Val-
ley II, the court did not rule on the sufficiency of the minimum-impact 
determination.217 It simply found that the Corps had made a mini-
mum-impact determination, and left the arbitrary, capricious or an 
abuse of discretion argument for the plaintiffs to reassert on re-
mand.218 Concluding that no provision of the CWA specifies “how the 
Corps must make the minimal-impact determination, the degree of 
certainty that must undergird them, or the extent to which the Corps 
may rely on post-issuance procedures in making them,” the Fourth 
Circuit has left these decisions to the discretion of the Corps.219
 However, given the courts’ tendency to side with the Corps and 
the priorities of the Bush administration,220 plaintiffs will have a diffi-
cult time showing that the Corps’s actions were arbitrary, capricious, 
or an abuse of discretion.221 This is especially true because the court 
has recognized that it is nearly impossible to initially guarantee that 
an activity authorized under a NWP will result in no more than mini-
mal environmental impacts.222 Because the Corps must try to forecast 
the authorized activity’s potential environmental consequences if un-
dertaken anywhere in the country under any set of circumstances, 
such conclusions are bound to be faulty.223 While conceding that 
minimum-impact determinations for NWPs cannot be more than rea-
soned predictions, the court in Ohio Valley II still upheld the legality of 
NWP 21.224
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 Aside from the courts, environmentalists could encourage EPA to 
help promote the protectionist goals of the CWA by revoking NWP 
21.225 While the Corps has primary control over the granting of per-
mits, EPA has authority to repeal a permit issued by the Corps.226 
However, the goals of the current Administration— “[to] maximiz[e] 
domestic fuel production and eas[e] federal environmental restric-
tions on coal mining operations” —indicate that a push to strengthen 
the environmental safeguards built into the Corps’s general permit-
ting authority is unlikely.227
 A stronger argument for environmentalists to make concerns the 
timing of the minimal-impact determinations.228 Because the court 
has held that NWPs are valid even though accurate minimal-impact 
determinations cannot be performed prior to their authorization,229 
environmentalists must push for a ruling that section 404(e) unambi-
guously requires minimum-impact determinations before issuance of a 
NWP, and especially before a project commences.230 If a determina-
tion is made prior to the start of the activity—as long as it is based on 
solid research, even if faulty—it is better than no initial determination 
at all. Initial research could indicate potential environmental impacts 
not previously considered, allowing for more adequate mitigation, 
modification, or even cancellation of the activity. 
 Not requiring minimal-impact determinations to be made before 
issuance of a NWP weakens the CWA’s primary purpose of protecting 
the environment.231 To ease the burden imposed on the Corps, Con-
gress allowed it to issue general permits; however, Congress was aware 
that the use of general permits could reduce environmental protec-
tion.232 Therefore, Congress authorized the Corps to issue general 
permits only after it has concluded that the activity will cause “only 
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minimal adverse environmental effects.”233 Removing this procedural 
hurdle eviscerates the distinction drawn by Congress between individ-
ual and general permits issued under section 404 of the CWA.234
 If the Corps is unable to make the required minimal-effects de-
termination, it should be required to utilize the more burdensome 
procedures of section 404(a) and only issue individual permits.235 Al-
lowing the Corps to issue general permits without first making mini-
mal-impact determinations makes section 404(e) significantly weaker 
than Congress intended.236 The strong protectionist goal of the CWA 
will be undermined and the environment will suffer as a result.237
 Even putting aside legislative intent, one would be compelled to 
conclude that the Corps is required to make minimal-impact deter-
minations by following its own rational for upholding the validity of 
NWPs.238 The Corps contends that the NWP program is valid without 
requiring an environmental impact statement (EIS) because NWPs 
are authorized only for activities that have no more than minimal ad-
verse effects on the aquatic environment.239 However, if activities are 
commenced before the potential effects are determined, the Corps’s 
reasoning fails.240 The NWP will already have been authorized, even 
though it has not yet been concluded that the activities permitted will 
cause no more than minimal impacts. 
 By requiring minimal-impact determinations before a project 
commences, the chance of significant environmental harm occurring 
can be minimized, if not eliminated. However, if these determinations 
take place after a project begins, and the project causes more than 
minimal adverse effects, the damage must be mitigated.241 Under a sec-
tion 404 permit, a permittee is required to perform mitigation for the 
environmental damage that results from its activities,242 but this mitiga-
tion is often not completed.243 Even when it is completed, it is often 
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either “poorly designed or carelessly implemented.”244 Thus, the miti-
gation provisions in the permits cannot be relied upon for effective en-
forcement.245 If harm is identified before it occurs, it can be prevented. 
Thus, it would not be necessary to fall back on the unreliable environ-
mental safety measure of mitigation.246
Conclusion 
 The strength of the CWA—with its goal of protecting of the wa-
ters of the United States—has been threatened by the Corps’s in-
creased use of general permitting in mountaintop coal mining. Re-
cent lawsuits have illustrated the significant damage that can result 
from mountaintop coal mining, but the Fourth Circuit has made it 
difficult to protect the environment by upholding the use of NWP 21. 
Ohio Valley II, although consistent with previous rulings granting in-
creasing environmental regulatory power to the Corps, did not put an 
end to this environmental debate. By focusing on the questions left 
unresolved by Congress and the court, environmentalists still have an 
opportunity to help guarantee that the goal of the CWA is achieved. 
 To ensure greater environmental protection, two aspects of the 
Corps’s general permitting process should be challenged. First, the 
adequacy of the minimum-impact determinations the Corps was re-
quired to perform when it enacted NWP 21 should be contested. The 
courts have held that authorization of a NWP is not precluded by the 
impossibility of an initial guarantee that an activity authorized under a 
NWP will result in no more than minimal environmental effects; how-
ever, a more detailed initial investigation should still be mandated. 
 Second, the wording of section 404, the legislative intent, and the 
Corps’s own reasoning all indicate that section 404(e) requires that 
minimum-impact determinations be made before issuance of a NWP. 
Any other ruling would eviscerate the distinction drawn by Congress 
between individual and general permits, and significantly weaken the 
protectionist goals of the CWA. If the Corps cannot adequately per-
form the required minimal-effects determination, it should be re-
quired to employ the more cumbersome procedures of section 404(a) 
and issue individual permits only. 
                                                                                                                      
244 See William S. Pufko, The Revised Definition of “Discharge of Dredged Material”: Its Legal-
ity, Practicality, and Impact on Wetlands Protection, 9 Envtl. Law. 187, 245 (2003). 
245 See id. 
246 See id.; NRC Report, supra note 243, at 101. 
206 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:179 
 Recent coal mining accidents have attracted national attention to 
the issue of mining safety, resulting in the review of coal mining safety 
regulations, as well as a push by both the states and federal government 
toward stricter enforcement of the current regulations. Given this focus 
on coal mining, it is possible—although unlikely with the current Ad-
ministration—that the regulations pertaining to mountaintop coal min-
ing will be considered anew. It is a good time, however, for environ-
mentalists to push their cause and make the general public more aware 
of mountaintop coal mining’s adverse environmental effects. 
